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REMEMBERING THE LESSONS OF THE BASEBALL EXEMPTION IN NCAA V. ALSTON 
Sam C. Ehrlich* 
Introduction 
    It is somewhat ironic that the recently-granted Supreme Court appeal in National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) v. Alston1 falls so near the 100-year anniversary 
of Federal Baseball v. National League,2 a well-debated opinion by the Supreme Court 
that gave a particular sports league—and, for decades only that sports league—broad 
immunity from the antitrust laws.  In doing so, the Court set up the field of sports antitrust 
law in a way that would position professional baseball apart from the other leagues to a 
degree that the Court would later remark is “unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical.”3  
Indeed, even a sitting member of the Court has remarked on the baseball exemption’s 
controversial nature, noting that Federal Baseball has been “pilloried pretty consistently 
in the legal literature since at least the 1940s.”4 
    That sitting member of the Court, Justice Alito, did agree with commentary that 
Federal Baseball was mostly correct for its time; indeed he deemed a scholarly 
assessment of Federal Baseball’s criticism as “principally for things that were not in the 
opinion, but later added by Toolson and Flood,” to be “accurate.”5  As Justice Alito 
mentioned, the Supreme Court had “at least two opportunities to overrule the Federal 
Baseball case” and did so both times “over withering dissents.”6  Thus while Federal 
Baseball may not deserve its notorious reputation, decisions by the Court to continue to 
affirm the baseball exemption—especially while completely undercutting Federal 
Baseball’s legal underpinnings in Flood—are certainly fair game for questioning.7 
    While the Alston Petitioners (the NCAA and member conferences) have strategically 
refused to frame it this way, this Supreme Court now—99 years after Federal Baseball—
once again faces a question about whether to grant a request by a sports league for an 
antitrust exemption.8  But unlike in Toolson and Flood, the doctrinal history 
 
* Sam C. Ehrlich, J.D./Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Boise State University College of 
Business and Economics. This Essay was submitted with some revisions as a merits-stage amicus brief in 
the discussed Supreme Court litigation. See Brief for Professor Sam C. Ehrlich as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, NCAA & Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston, (2021) (No. 20-512, -520). 
1 No. 20-512 (2021). This litigation has been combined with a separate appeal by the NCAA’s member 
conferences. See Am. Athletic Assoc. v. Alston, 20-520 (2021). Both cases appeal In re NCAA Grant-in-
Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation (Alston v. NCAA), 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020). 
2 Federal Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
3 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957). 
4 Samuel A. Alito, Jr., The Origin of the Baseball Antitrust Exemption: Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore, 
Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 34 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 183, 192 (2009). 
5 Id. at 193 (quoting Kevin McDonald, Antitrust and Baseball: Stealing Holmes, 1998 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 89, 
122 (1998)); see also Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953); see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 
U.S. 258 (1972) (affirming baseball’s antitrust exemption on the basis of stare decisis). 
6 Alito, supra note 4, at 192. 
7 See Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-84 (overruling Federal Baseball’s finding that professional baseball is not 
interstate commerce but keeping in place baseball’s corresponding antitrust exemption on the grounds of 
stare decisis and “a recognition and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs”). 
8 Alston, 958 F.3d 1239. 










underpinning this case presents little basis for an argument of binding stare decisis based 
on past court decisions, as the language Petitioners continuously point to as what compels 
the courts to grant them “ample latitude” under the antitrust laws is merely dicta.9  After 
all—as the Ninth Circuit found—while the Supreme Court “certainly discussed the 
NCAA's amateurism rules at great length” in Board of Regents, “it did not do so in order 
to pass upon the rules’ merits, given that they were not before the Court.”10 
    The Court should hold firm to its decades of precedent strongly disfavoring implicit, 
court-made antitrust exemptions.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly noted a “heavy 
presumption against implicit exemptions” to the Sherman Act.11   Such powers should 
be reserved to Congress, who has thus far declined to grant the Petitioners that deference 
despite repeated opportunities to do so. In fact, such opportunities have only increased in 
recent years—with at least three separate public Senate hearings since July 1, 2020—
with no signed bill or reported consensus.12 
    At the heart of the Court’s justification for affirming the baseball exemption in 
Toolson was that “Congress . . . had [Federal Baseball] under consideration but has not 
seen fit to bring such business under these laws by legislation having prospective 
effect.”13  If that statement is true, its corollary must also be true: that since Congress has 
had plenty of opportunities to consider the Petitioners’ requests for antitrust immunity 
but “has not seen fit” to grant that request through legislation, this Court should cede to 
Congress’s inaction.14 
    This Essay takes no position on whether the Ninth Circuit decision should be affirmed 
or overruled.  Instead, the position argued herein is that regardless of the Court’s 
conclusion in this case, the NCAA’s underlying assertions that they are entitled to 
antitrust immunity for amateurism-related activities based on the precedent of Board of 
Regents should be rejected.  As argued, Board of Regents provides no stare decisis on 
this point, and any approach by this Court that grants such antitrust immunity fails to 
consider the powerful lessons of the Court-enacted baseball antitrust exemption. 
 
9 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120A (1984). See also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 
1063 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that “[t]he Court’s long encomium to amateurism [in Board of Regents], 
though impressive-sounding, was therefore dicta”). 
10 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063. 
11 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 777 (1975).  See also California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 
(1962) (“Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied”); Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug, 
440 U.S. 205, 231 (1979) (“It is well settled that exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly 
construed”); So. Motor Carriers Rate Conf. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 67 (1985) (“Implied antitrust 
immunities, however, are disfavored . . .”). 
12 See Exploring a Compensation Framework for Intercollegiate Athletics Before the S. Comm. on Com., 
Sci., and Transp., 116th Cong. (2020); Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020); Compensating College Athletes: Examining the Potential Impact on 
Athletes and Institutions Before the S. Comm. on Health, Ed., Labor, and Pensions, 116th Cong. (2020). 
13 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. 
14 Id. 
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I. The Alston Litigation 
    Alston involves a challenge to the NCAA’s implementation of caps on grant-in-aid—
education-related benefits afforded by member institutions to athletes that play the so-
called NCAA ‘revenue sports: Division I football and basketball.15  After an extensive 
bench trial, Judge Claudia Wilken of the Northern District Court of California found that 
the NCAA had violated antitrust law by imposing limits on education-related 
compensation, specifically finding—based on Rule of Reason analysis—that “an 
alternative compensation scheme” allowing limits on “compensation and benefits 
unrelated to education” while still “generally prohibit[ing] the NCAA from limiting 
education-related benefits” would be “virtually as effective as the challenged rules in 
achieving the only procompetitive effect” shown by the NCAA defendants: the 
preservation of explicitly amateur intercollegiate sports.16  Judge Wilken also issued an 
injunction to that effect.17 
    Hearing a challenge to those findings and the corresponding injunction on appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Judge Wilken properly applied the Rule of Reason 
in analyzing the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s compensation practices against 
their alleged procompetitive benefits.18  The Ninth Circuit found that Judge Wilken’s 
injunction distinguishing between education-related benefits and other benefits not 
related to compensation was proper, holding that education-related benefits “are easily 
distinguishable from professional salaries, as they are ‘connect[ed] to education’; ‘their 
value is inherently limited to their actual costs’; and ‘they can be provided in kind, not in 
cash.’”19  As such, the panel upheld Judge Wilken’s Solomon-like compromise in 
reliance on stage three of the Rule of Reason test, where the delineation between 
education-related benefits and outside compensation was presented as a reasonable 
alternative between upholding the NCAA’s limits on compensation and revoking them 
entirely.20 
    Judge Wilken and the Ninth Circuit’s holdings were notable, not just for their finding 
that NCAA rules imposed for the preservation of amateurism could be found to have 
violated antitrust law, but also because their insistence on using the Rule of Reason 
presented a marked distinction with other circuits’ handling of NCAA rules under the 
antitrust laws.  Indeed, the NCAA argued extensively in their petition for certiorari that 
the Ninth Circuit had—with both Alston and its similar holding in 2015’s O’Bannon v. 
NCAA21—created a circuit split between themselves and the Seventh Circuit, which had 
 
15 See Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1244-46 (9th Cir. 2020). 
16 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
17 See Permanent Injunction, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 375 F.Supp.3d 
1058 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2019) (No. 14-md-02541), ECF No. 1163. 
18 Alston, 958 F.3d at 1244. 
19 Id. at 1260 (quoting In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1102). 
20 Id. 
21 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 










articulated its role in arbitrating the legality of NCAA rules in a very different way on 
two recent occasions.22 
 
II. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme 
Court Precedent to Grant the NCAA a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from 
the Antitrust Laws 
    At issue is the circuits’ interpretation of the Supreme Court’s only other case applying 
antitrust law to NCAA activities: NCAA v. Board of Regents, a 1984 decision finding the 
NCAA liable for restricting the television broadcast rights of its member institutions.23  
For the past thirty-six years, lower courts have wrestled with how to interpret the Court’s 
language in this case, specifically the portions of Justice John Paul Stevens’s majority 
opinion that discuss the NCAA’s eligibility rules concerning the amateur status of college 
athletes.24  In his conclusion, Justice Stevens wrote that the NCAA “plays a critical role 
in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.”25  As such, 
Justice Stevens wrote, there is “no question but that” the NCAA “needs ample latitude to 
play that role” in order to “preserve a tradition that might otherwise die.”26 
    It is in that call for “ample latitude” where courts have struggled with formulating an 
exact proportional response under the Board of Regents precedent.  As frequently 
discussed by the NCAA and its conferences in briefs, the Seventh Circuit has cited this 
language to find that NCAA bylaws that “‘fit into the same mold’ as eligibility rules” 
and “clearly protect[] amateurism” require a finding by a court “to deem such rules 
procompetitive,” as “they define what it means to be an amateur or a student-athlete, and 
are therefore essential to the very existence of the product of college football.”27 
    The Seventh Circuit’s broad interpretation of Board of Regents as having compelled 
courts to give wide-ranging deference for NCAA amateurism activities can also be 
 
22 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19-23, NCAA v. Alston, No. 20-512 (2020); see Agnew v. NCAA, 683 
F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012); Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498 (7th Cir. 2018). This author noted in a certiorari-
stage amicus brief that the circuit split at issue is actually a three-tiered circuit split. Brief for Professor Sam 
C. Ehrlich as Amicus Curiae, NCAA & Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston, Nos. 20-512, 20-520, 2020 WL 
6802302 (Nov. 13, 2020); see also Sam C. Ehrlich, A Three-Tiered Circuit Split: Why the Supreme Court 
Was Right to Hear Alston v. NCAA, J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT (forthcoming 2021). The third prong of the 
split comes from the Third and Sixth Circuit, which have found that NCAA rules in furtherance of 
amateurism are non- or “anti-commercial” due to their role of taking money out of college sports, leaving 
them outside the Sherman Act’s purview entirely. Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F. 3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008); see 
also Marshall v. ESPN Inc., 111 F. Supp. 3d 815, 834 (M.D. Tenn. 2015), aff’d, 668 Fed. Appx. 155 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Agnew for the commercial/noncommercial 
distinction espoused by Bassett.) Notably, the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon thought Bassett’s reasoning was 
“simply wrong.” 802 F.3d at 1066. 
23 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
24 Id. at 120A. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 343 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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shown through its spread to other areas of law. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently 
cited Board of Regents to hold that college athletes cannot be subject to federal wage and 
hour law, as, in their view, the “revered tradition of amateurism in college sports” cited 
by Justice Stevens “defines the economic reality of the relationship between student 
athletes and their schools.”28  As such, the Seventh Circuit found that the standard 
multifactor tests for employment status “‘fail to capture the true nature of the 
relationship’ between student athletes and their schools” and thus found that relationship 
to not represent an employment relationship.29 
   Conversely, in the underlying case to Alston the Ninth Circuit properly affirmed the 
district court’s use of the Rule of Reason test to determine the legality of the disputed 
NCAA bylaws.30  Rather than relying on Board of Regents to grant wide immunity to the 
Petitioners activities—as the Seventh Circuit has prescribed—the Ninth Circuit gave due 
deference to the preservation of amateurism in college sports by allowing it as a 
procompetitive purpose at the second step of Rule of Reason analysis before affirming 
the district court’s fact-based finding that the bylaws at issue were more restrictive than 
necessary to preserve amateurism in college sports.31 This is precisely how the Rule of 
Reason should operate, and—barring a Congressionally-mandated antitrust exemption—
exactly how deference to the preservation of amateurism should be afforded under Board 
of Regents when analyzing NCAA activities under the antitrust laws. 
   Instead of granting the Petitioners a threshold-level exemption from antitrust law the 
Ninth Circuit accurately placed the question of what comprises “ample latitude” into the 
Rule of Reason test, allowing the Petitioners to argue the merits of its preservation of 
“‘amateurism,’ which, in turn, ‘widen[s] consumer choice’ by maintaining a distinction 
between college and professional sports” as a procompetitive rationale that may—or may 
not—outweigh its activities in restraint of trade.32 This allows courts to consider whether 
these rules are “patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary to accomplish all of 
its procompetitive objectives.”33 
   There can be no question that the Ninth Circuit’s approach is the only correct 
interpretation of the breadth of the “ample latitude” that must be provided to NCAA 
activities and at what stage of antitrust litigation that “ample latitude” must be 
considered. Justice Stevens and the rest of the Board of Regents majority, after all, did 
not explicitly state that this “ample latitude” must be in the form of a wholesale, 
threshold-level exemption from the antitrust laws, or any other law at that. Such questions 
were not even before the Court in Board of Regents. 
 
28 Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 291 (7th Cir. 2016). 
29 Id. (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
30 See Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 2020). 
31 Alston, 958 F.3d at 1260. 
32 Id. at 1257. See also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing the merits 
of preservation of amateurism as a procompetitive purpose to its restraints of trade at the second step of the 
Rule of Reason test). 
33 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075. See also Alston, 958 F.3d at 1260. 










   Indeed, the NCAA rules that were before the Court in Board of Regents—output 
restrictions on college football television broadcasts—were found to have “restricted 
rather than enhanced the place of intercollegiate athletics.”34 While Justice Stevens did 
write of rules that “are justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic 
teams and therefore procompetitive,” no language by the Court in Board of Regents 
explicitly stated that those rules should be fully above the law.35 The Third Circuit noted 
this essential point in Smith v. NCAA, as they stated that “no court of appeals expressly 
has addressed the issue of whether antitrust laws apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of 
eligibility rules.”36 Given that Smith was decided fourteen years after Board of Regents, 
one can reasonably assume that the Third Circuit knew of the Supreme Court’s call for 
“ample latitude” in Board of Regents and did not read “ample latitude” as representing a 
wholesale exemption from antitrust law. 
   Supporting this much more limited reading of Board of Regents is entirely consistent 
with this Court’s long-standing disfavor of implicit, court-made exemptions to the 
antitrust laws.37  A wholesale “procompetitive presumption”—as formulated by the 
Seventh Circuit in Agnew v. NCAA38 and applied in Deppe v. NCAA39— is too close to a 
blanket exemption from the Sherman Act to be warranted under the law.  By contrast, 
the Ninth Circuit’s approach in this litigation, which places the onus on the Petitioners to 
prove that their alleged procompetitive rationales—including the defense and 
maintenance of amateurism—outweigh the clear anticompetitive effects of the 
Petitioners’ price fixing schemes, is the approach that should be adopted moving forward. 
III. Granting Antitrust Immunity to the NCAA Would Repeat the Same 
Mistakes of Federal Baseball v. National League 
    Regardless of what one might think of the Supreme Court’s creation of the baseball 
antitrust exemption in Federal Baseball v. National League,40 it is undisputed that 
 
34 NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120A (1984). 
35 Id. 
36 Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998). 
37 See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 777 (1975) (“[O]ur cases have repeatedly established 
that there is a heavy presumption against implicit exemptions [to § 1 of the Sherman Act]”); FPC, 369 U.S. 
at 485 (“Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied.”) While the Supreme Court held in 
American Needle v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010), that “teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by 
antitrust law” as their shared interests “provide[] perfectly sensible justification for making a host of 
collective decisions,” that holding was clear that Rule of Reason analysis is still required to weigh that 
justification against its anticompetitive costs, even if that analysis “can sometimes be applied in the 
twinkling of an eye.” Id. at 202-04 (quoting Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 110). Instead, the Alston 
Petitioners seek a ruling—based on the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in Agnew, 683 F.3d at 341-42, and 
Deppe, 893 F.3d at 501-02—that all restrictions of the college athlete labor market in furtherance of 
amateurism are presumptively procompetitive, thus automatically outweighing any alleged anticompetitive 
harm put before the court. This request is not consistent with American Needle.  
38 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341-42 (7th Cir. 2012). 
39 Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2018). 
40 Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
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numerous judges—including those currently sitting on the Supreme Court—have 
bemoaned its existence.  The Second Circuit famously referred to Federal Baseball as 
“not one of Mr. Justice Holmes’ happiest days” while deeming the rationale of Toolson’s 
affirmance of Federal Baseball to be “extremely dubious.”41  Even while affirming the 
baseball exemption in Flood v. Kuhn, the Supreme Court called the baseball exemption 
“an exception and an anomaly” and an “aberration.” 42  Writing in dissent, Justice 
Douglas called the baseball exemption “a derelict in the stream of the law that we, its 
creator, should remove.”43 In fact, the Supreme Court wrote in an earlier case (which 
declined to extend the baseball exemption to professional football) that “were we 
considering the question of baseball for the first time upon a clean slate we would have 
no doubts” that the sport should not receive the protection given to them in Federal 
Baseball.44 
    In the years following Federal Baseball, the Supreme Court has steadfastly refused 
to extend baseball’s antitrust immunity to other sports.45  As noted above, the Third 
Circuit found fourteen years after Board of Regents that no court—including this one—
had “addressed the issue of whether antitrust laws apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of 
eligibility rules.”46 
    But should Alston be found in favor of the Petitioners in a manner similar to the 
“procompetitive presumption” for amateurism rules as the Seventh Circuit has now twice 
espoused47—or, even worse, by declaring NCAA amateurism restrictions to be non- or 
even “anti-commercial” as the Sixth Circuit did in Bassett v. NCAA48—the mistakes of 
Federal Baseball would be repeated all over again.  The NCAA Petitioners make their 
request for antitrust deference based on the preservation of ‘amateurism,’ citing Board 
of Regents.49 However, Judge Wilken at the Northern District Court of California 
correctly found that this concept of ‘amateurism’ in intercollegiate sports comes with “no 
stand-alone definition” and a wholly incomplete and inconsistent explanation of what 
can be considered to be “pay,” at least based on plain language definitions of the term.50  
 
41 Salerno v. Am. League, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970).  
42 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) 
43 Id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
44 Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957). 
45 See id. at passim (declining to exempt professional football from antitrust law); see also United States v. 
International Boxing Club of New York, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (declining to exempt professional boxing from 
antitrust law); see also Flood, 707 U.S. at 282-83 (“Other professional sports operating interstate—football, 
boxing, basketball, and, presumably, hockey and golf—are not so exempt.”). 
46 Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998). 
47 See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341-42 (7th Cir. 2012); see Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 489, 501-02 
(7th Cir. 2018). 
48 Bassett, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008). 
49 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120A (1984). 
50 In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation, 375 F.Supp.3d 1058, 1070-71 (N.D. Cal. 
2019).   










    The flimsy nature of the Petitioners’ request for antitrust deference based on 
‘amateurism’ can only bring back strong memories of Federal Baseball’s definition of 
professional baseball as merely “exhibitions . . . which are purely state affairs.”51  Just as 
how that definition may have been true in 1922 but is not true now, the Petitioners’ and 
some lower courts’ vision of the relationship between college athletes and their schools 
as entirely divorced from economic consideration may have been true several decades 
ago (including when Board of Regents was decided), but is certainly not true in modern 
times.52  Given that trajectory, one wonders what judges and legal scholars 100 years 
from now might think of the Supreme Court’s decision in this case should that decision 
have the effect of granting antitrust immunity to NCAA activities, even if that immunity 
is narrower than the nearly-unlimited exemption that baseball enjoys to this day. 
    Moreover, unlike in Federal Baseball’s progeny—Toolson and Flood—no stare 
decisis binds this Court to continue any existing antitrust immunity. Regardless of what 
one may think of the power of language in Board of Regents, language on amateurism is 
merely dicta, as noted above. It is dicta that should certainly be given its fair respect, but 
it is dicta that gives no firm statement that the Court is bound to give any true, threshold-
level antitrust immunity to the Petitioners, as demonstrated by the circuit split between 
courts attempting to interpret the Board of Regents amateurism language.  Board of 
Regents’s call for courts to afford the NCAA “ample latitude” to promulgate amateurism 
restrictions is vague enough to be interpretable in an infinite number of ways, even by 
simply allowing amateurism as a valid procompetitive purpose in Rule of Reason 
analysis. That is exactly what the lower court did in this case.53  “Ample latitude” does 
not necessarily require an effective threshold-level exemption for activities implicating 
amateurism in college sports.  Thus, as precedent, the disputed Board of Regents 
language is wholly distinguishable from the much more directive Federal Baseball 
doctrine that was relied upon as stare decisis in Toolson and Flood. 
    In sum, this Essay argues that if the Supreme Court were to assess a broad reading of 
the well-cited Board of Regents language on amateurism to grant antitrust immunity to 
the NCAA, it would be accepting the NCAA’s implicit argument that intercollegiate 
sports are entitled to special treatment as compared with the other sports leagues.  A 
“revered tradition of amateurism in college sports”—as assessed by the Supreme Court 
more than 35 years ago—is not sufficient to justify such treatment.54  The grant of the 
decidedly baseball-like special treatment that Petitioners seek would be, in the Court’s 
own words, “unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical.”55  Furthermore, as the Supreme Court 
 
51 See Federal Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
52 See Agnew, 683 F.3d at 338-41 (describing the clearly economic nature of the modern intercollegiate 
sports labor market). 
53 See Alston, 958 F.3d at 1257-59. (allowing “a much narrower conception of amateurism that still gives 
rise to procompetitive effects” to be balanced as a procompetitive justification, rather than the NCAA’s 
“expansive conception of amateurism” that was found at the trial court to be unsupported by the evidence). 
54 Board of Regents, 486 U.S. at 120A. 
55 Radovich, 352 U.S. at 452. 
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has repeatedly stated, such grants should be exclusively in the hands of Congress, not the 
courts. 
IV.  Granting Antitrust Immunity to the Petitioners Would Disrupt the 
Ongoing Legislative Process Surrounding College Athletic Reform 
    It is of little secret that the Alston Petitioners have been engaged with various 
members of Congress to lobby for legislation to preempt recently-passed state legislation 
forcing change in NCAA name, image, and likeness (NIL) policy.56 The NCAA 
Petitioners even cited this Congressional action in their own petition for writ of 
certiorari.57 
    Such legislation would presumably include—if Congress so chooses—immunity 
from antitrust enforcement.  Indeed, a lawyer from the outgoing Department of Justice 
also recently sent a letter to the NCAA warning that their proposed direction on NIL 
reform measures “may raise concerns under the antitrust laws.”58  Citing this letter, the 
NCAA has now delayed voting on its proposed NIL and athlete transfer rules 
indefinitely, presumably waiting to see whether it can receive antitrust immunity for 
these rules from Congress—or from the Supreme Court in Alston—first.59 
    But in the past year, the Petitioners received no less than three opportunities to lobby 
Congress in legislative hearings debating the extent to which Congress should 
 
56 See, e.g., Brett McMurphy (@Brett_McMurphy), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 12:48 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Brett_McMurphy/status/1266411058044035075 (attaching a letter from five Petitioner 
athletic conferences to Congress asking Congress to enact federal NIL legislation); NCAA Board of 
Governors, Federal and State Legislation Working Group, Final Report and Recommendations, NCAA 27 
(Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/ncaa/wrkgrps/fslwg/Apr2020FSLWG_Report.pdf; 
Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 4 
(2020) (statement of Mark Emmert, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association).   
57 Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 6, NCAA v. Alston, No. 20-512 (Oct. 15, 2020) (noting that Congress “is 
considering (with petitioner’s active involvement) whether to adopt federal legislation regarding student-
athlete compensation”). 
58 Steve Berkowitz & Christine Brennan, Justice Department Warns NCAA Over Transfer and Name, Image, 
Likeness Rules, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2021), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2021/01/08/justice-department-warns-ncaa-over-transfer-
and-money-making. 
59 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Division I Council Delays Vote on Transfer Rules and Name, Image and 
Likeness, USA TODAY (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2021/01/11/ncaa-
voted-delayed-transfer-rules-name-image-and-likeness/6629391002/. 










intervene.60 These efforts have led to several proposed bills, some of which have been 
formally submitted by several different Members of Congress for committee review.61 
    Most of this proposed legislation includes some degree of antitrust immunity for the 
Petitioners’ activities, as well as immunity under federal and state wage-and-hour statutes 
like the Fair Labor Standards Act.62 But Congress has thus far failed to take any action 
to pass this legislation and grant the relief that the Alston Petitioners now seek from the 
Supreme Court.63 
    The Supreme Court’s prior precedent, placing the role of creating antitrust immunity 
in the hands of the legislative branch, should hold due to the lack of Federal Baseball-
like stare decisis or existing legislation already prescribing the NCAA antitrust immunity 
for amateurism restrictions.  As an example, this case has strong similarities to the fact 
pattern leading to the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Philadelphia National 
Bank,64 where the Court rejected the argument that Congress intended to confer an 
antitrust exemption to the banking industry through a 1950 amendment which had added 
an assets-acquisition provision to § 7 of the Clayton Act.65  By reviewing the 
amendment’s legislative history, the Court held that there was “no indication . . . that 
Congress wished to confer a special dispensation upon the banking industry,” and if 
Congress desired to grant a wider exemption than the narrow amendment granting 
exemption solely to asset acquisition, “surely it would have exempted the industry” either 
at that time or through later legislation.66 
    Despite Petitioner’s efforts, Congress has thus far refused to grant this request.  Like 
the bankers in Philadelphia National Bank, Petitioners should not be permitted to 
continue to usurp the legislative process by asking the Court to grant them antitrust 
protection that Congress has, at least thus far, declined to grant to them.67  Such power 
 
60 See Compensating College Athletes: Examining the Potential Impact on Athletes and Institutions Before 
the S. Comm. on Health, Ed., Labor, and Pensions, 116th Cong. (2020); Exploring a Compensation 
Framework for Intercollegiate Athletics Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., and Transp., 116th Cong. 
(2020); Protecting the Integrity of College Athletics Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 
(2020).   
61 See, e.g., Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, S. 4004, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced by Senator Marco 
Rubio); Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act, S. 5003, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced by Senator 
Roger Wicker); Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, H. R. 8382, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced by 
Representative Anthony Gonzalez). 
62 See Andy Staples and Nicole Auerbach, Which Bill to Compensate College Athletes Will Win Out, and 
Which One Should?, THE ATHLETIC (Dec. 28, 2020), https://theathletic.com/2287100/2020/12/28/ncaa-
congress-name-image-likeness-bill/ (summarizing the proposed NIL legislation before Congress). 
63 See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281-83 (1972) (citing as persuasive the “numerous and persistent” 
legislative proposals that Congress failed to pass and finding that since Congress had yet to enact this 
legislation, they clearly intended baseball’s treatment under the antitrust laws to remain as is).  
64 U.S. v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). 
65 Id. at 340-48. 
66 Id. at 348. 
67 See So. Motor Carriers Rate Conf., 471 U.S. at 67 (citing “Only Congress, expressly or by implication, 
may authorize price fixing, and has done so in particular industries or compelling circumstances”).   
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should be left in the hands of the legislative branch, which will allow Congress to grant 
the Petitioners antitrust immunity only when it sees fit. 
V. Conclusion 
    As noted, this Essay takes no position on whether the Ninth Circuit decision should 
be affirmed or overruled.  This Essay instead submits that the Court is faced with a second 
choice and question of law: whether to affirm the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Agnew 
v. NCAA68 and Deppe v. NCAA69 of granting broad antitrust immunity through a 
“procompetitive presumption” for the Petitioners’ activities related to amateurism; or 
whether to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s approach, which has rejected Petitioners’ claim to 
antitrust immunity and instead forced them to justify their conduct by balancing 
procompetitive effects against anticompetitive harms.70   
    In the view of this Essay, that decision should be clear.  The Ninth Circuit’s approach 
properly applies the Rule of Reason to weigh the merits of the Petitioners’ conduct in its 
proper holistic context.  By contrast, the Seventh Circuit precedent relied on by the 
Petitioners improperly reads Board of Regents dicta to grant implied antitrust immunity 
in a way that runs counter to decades of Court precedent.  Affirming that approach over 
the Ninth Circuit’s methodology—thus reading into Board of Regents an antitrust 
exemption for amateur sports—would resurrect the failed reasoning of Toolson and 
Flood. 
    The Supreme Court should not create another sport-specific antitrust exemption that 
would haunt its legacy.  This is particularly true since unlike in Toolson and Flood—
where Congress was faced with the choice of whether to remove an antitrust exemption 
created by firm and decisive doctrine by this Court—Congress is currently deciding 
whether to add antitrust immunity by answering the Petitioners’ call to exempt 
amateurism restrictions through legislation.  Thus, regardless of how the Supreme Court 
rules in Alston, its decision should properly leave the decision of antitrust immunity for 
amateurism activities to the legislative branch.  This can be done by either affirming the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding, or by taking a more narrow but decisive approach to reversal 
that makes clear that regardless of this Court’s judgment of the Ninth Circuit’s findings, 
its approach of relying on Rule of Reason analysis is the only correct and proper means 
of determining the legality of NCAA amateurism restrictions under the antitrust laws. 
 
68 Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 341-42 (7th Cir. 2012). 
69 Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2018). 
70 See Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); see also O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
